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ABSTRACT
Research on gambling near-misses has shown that objectively equivalent outcomes can yield divergent emotional and motivational responses.
The subjective processing of gambling outcomes is affected substantially by close but non-obtained outcomes (i.e. counterfactuals). In the
current paper, we investigate how different types of near-misses inﬂuence self-perceived luck and subsequent betting behavior in a wheel-
of-fortune task. We investigate the counterfactual mechanism of these effects by testing the relationship with a second task measuring
regret/relief processing. Across two experiments (Experiment 1, n= 51; Experiment 2, n= 104), we demonstrate that near-wins (neutral
outcomes that are close to a jackpot) decreased self-perceived luck, whereas near-losses (neutral outcomes that are close to a major penalty)
increased luck ratings. The effects of near-misses varied by near-miss position (i.e. whether the spinner stopped just short of, or passed
through, the counterfactual outcome), consistent with established distinctions between upward versus downward, and additive versus
subtractive, counterfactual thinking. In Experiment 1, individuals who showed stronger counterfactual processing on the regret/relief task were
more responsive to near-wins and near-losses on the wheel-of-fortune task. The effect of near-miss position was attenuated when the antici-
patory phase (i.e. the spin and deceleration) was removed in Experiment 2. Further differences were observed within the objective gains and
losses, between “clear” and “narrow” outcomes. Taken together, these results help substantiate the counterfactual mechanism of near-misses.
© 2017 The Authors Journal of Behavioral Decision Making Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
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INTRODUCTION
The outcomes of decisions we make have a pronounced ef-
fect upon our emotional state: we feel happy after obtained
successes, and sad or disappointed following losses and de-
feats. This focus on factual outcomes ﬁts the assumption of
traditional economic theory that we wish to maximize the
outcomes we obtain (Kahneman, 2011). However, it is in-
creasingly recognized that our feelings are also inﬂuenced
by “counterfactual outcomes”: outcomes we could have ob-
tained if only reality had taken another turn. Research on
counterfactual thinking shows that we are often strongly
affected by what might have happened, or what nearly
happened. An anecdote by Kahneman and Tversky (1982)
described two travelers, one who missed his ﬂight by
5minutes, and the other who missed the same ﬂight by
30minutes. Objectively, these two outcomes are equivalent
in that neither traveler caught the plane, but 96% of partici-
pants expected the ﬁrst traveler to feel worse. Here, the close-
ness to the desired outcome creates an upward counterfactual
(“He almost made the ﬂight!”), such that a narrowly missed
desirable outcome intensiﬁes the emotional response (in this
case, regret).
A more extreme example arises when people who perform
objectively better in a contest can ultimately feel worse than
those who perform less well, a phenomenon termed “satis-
faction reversal” (Medvec & Savitsky, 1997). Olympic silver
medalists describe less satisfaction at their achievements than
bronze medalists (Medvec, Madey, & Gilovich, 1995), pre-
sumably due to the opposite inﬂuences of the counterfactual
thoughts “I nearly won the gold” (silver) and “I nearly
missed out on a medal” (bronze). Medvec and Savitsky
(1997) developed these observations into a model of categor-
ical cutoff points: values that impose qualitative boundaries
on quantitative outcomes (which are frequently arbitrary,
such as exam thresholds) can thereby induce counterfactual
thoughts. As part of their model, they showed that the simple
act of surpassing a grade cutoff elicits downward counterfac-
tuals and increases positive affect, and conversely just miss-
ing a cutoff triggers upward counterfactuals and decreased
satisfaction.
These effects of counterfactual outcomes are ubiquitous in
gambling behavior, which itself offers a paradigm for study-
ing decision-making more broadly (see Clark et al., 2013, for
a review). The classic gambling “near-miss” refers to a non-
win outcome that falls tantalizingly close to the jackpot
(Clark, Lawrence, Astley-Jones, & Gray, 2009; Reid,
1986), such as a horse ﬁnishing in second place in a neck-
to-neck ﬁnish. Previous research has shown that these events
(henceforth labeled “near-wins” (NW) to avoid any semantic
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confusion between nearly winning and nearly losing) are ex-
perienced as aversive, but increased motivations to continue
gambling (Clark, Crooks, Clarke, Aitken, & Dunn, 2012;
Clark et al., 2009). Recent studies have extended the near-
miss phenomenon into the loss domain, enabling a compari-
son between NW and near-losses (NL). Experiments measur-
ing subjective responses to neutral outcomes that were close
to jackpot (i.e. NW) as well as neutral outcomes that were
close to a major penalty (i.e. NL) indicate that NL are also
processed as a discrete class of event (Dillon & Tinsley,
2008; Wohl & Enzle, 2003; Wu, van Dijk, & Clark, 2015;
Zhang & Covey, 2014).
Past work on these types of decision outcomes has tended
to focus on anecdotal scenarios (Dillon & Tinsley, 2008) or
single-shot decisions (Wohl & Enzle, 2003). In the present
study, we developed a multi-shot task based on a wheel-of-
fortune game to compare responses to these various outcome
types within the same participant. We looked at how these
outcomes inﬂuenced perceptions of luck, and betting deci-
sions on the subsequent trial. Luck ratings capture the ele-
ment of chance in decision outcomes and are known to be
sensitive not only to the objective outcome valence, but also
to close counterfactuals (Teigen, 1995). We also measured
trial-by-trial bet amount change as a function of the preced-
ing trial (see also Demaree, Burns, Dedonno, Agarwala, &
Everhart, 2012).
Our ﬁrst aim was to investigate how people respond to
null outcomes that differed only in whether they were close
to a win (i.e. NW) or close to a loss (i.e. NL) (see
Figure 1). In a prior study using a wheel-of-fortune task
where we highlighted each wheel segment successively, we
found that null outcomes that were close to a signiﬁcant pen-
alty elicited downward counterfactuals and increased self-
perceived luck, whereas null outcomes that were close to a
jackpot elicited upward counterfactuals and decreased self-
perceived luck (Wu, van Dijk, Clark, 2015; see also Wohl
& Enzle, 2003). We sought to corroborate these effects of
NW and NL using an improved version of the task with a
spinner that allowed a continuously varying position, so that
outcomes could fall close to the boundary to the next
segment.
The second aim was to explore if these effects of near out-
comes were further moderated by their position relative to
the missed outcome; that is to say, when the spinner stopped
just before the win/loss segment, compared to when the spin-
ner stopped just after the win/loss segment. Using a slot ma-
chine task, we have previously described how NW that stop
just short of the winning line primarily act to increase moti-
vation to continue, whereas NW that pass through the win-
ning line generate a more aversive effect (Clark, Liu, et al.,
2013). These differential effects can be explained in terms
of counterfactual thinking, drawing upon the distinction be-
tween additive and subtractive counterfactual thoughts. Ad-
ditive counterfactuals refer to those that add hypothetical
events to reality (e.g. “If only I had an umbrella, I would
not have gotten wet”), whereas subtractive counterfactuals
involve removing or “undoing” events from reality (i.e. “If
only it hadn’t rained today, I would not have gotten wet”)
(Roese & Olson, 1993). Additive and subtractive counterfac-
tuals have differential effects upon mood and behavioral reg-
ulation (Roese, 1994). On a slot machine, NW where the reel
stops before the payline position would likely generate a
counterfactual thought that the reel’s trajectory might have
continued to the jackpot position (an additive counterfac-
tual), whereas for the NW after the payline, the gambler must
mentally reverse the subsequent step, a subtractive counter-
factual (Clark et al., 2013). This difference in the type of
counterfactual thought may explain the contrasting
emotional and motivational effects engendered by these
two events (Clark et al., 2013; see also Markman &
McMullen, 2003).
In the present study (Experiment 1 and 2), the spinner de-
celerated in a clockwise direction, and it could stop fraction-
ally before entering a winning (or losing) segment, or just
Figure 1. The wheel-of-fortune task. The arrow outside of the wheel indicates the movement direction of the spinner. [Colour ﬁgure can be
viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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after exiting a winning (or losing) segment. Based upon the
slot machine data, we predicted that the spinner stopping just
after a win location (NW after, henceforth a “NW-after”)
would be perceived as unluckier than when it stopped just
before (henceforth a “NW-before”), and that a NW-before
may increase the subsequent amount bet as a reﬂection of in-
creased motivation.
The other major aim of this study was to examine the re-
lationship between individual differences in reactions to
near-miss events, and the behavior on a second task
assessing regret and relief processing (Mellers, Schwartz, &
Ritov, 1999). Prior work using anecdotes has asked partici-
pants to endorse counterfactual statements (Medvec et al.,
1995; Medvec & Savitsky, 1997) or to reﬂect on “how things
could be different” (Wohl & Enzle, 2003). These studies il-
lustrate that narrowly missing more or less desirable out-
comes elicited regret or relief (respectively), but these
methods may be considered prone to demand characteristics.
Other research on NW has primarily described these events
as triggering frustrative non-reward (Wadhwa & Kim,
2015) or attributions of skill acquisition (Clark et al.,
2013), mechanisms that need not inherently rely on counter-
factual processing. In the present study, we sought to test the
link between gambling near-misses and counterfactual think-
ing using a different approach, looking at individual differ-
ences in “counterfactual potency” on an independent task
(Camille et al., 2004; Camille et al., 2010; Gillan et al.,
2014; Wu & Clark, 2015). Previous research has character-
ized counterfactual potency as the multiplicative combina-
tion of “if likelihood” and “then likelihood”, and showed
this parameter correlated with intensity of emotional re-
sponses (Petrocelli, Percy, Sherman, & Tormala, 2011). In
Experiment 1, we used a second decision-making task where
participants choose between two gambles, and after viewing
their obtained outcome, the non-obtained outcome from the
unselected gamble was displayed. In this task, affect ratings
taken after each trial are sensitive not only to size of the ob-
tained outcome, but also to the non-obtained outcome. For
example, negative affect is strongest when the obtained out-
come is a loss and the non-obtained outcome is revealed to
be a major win (Camille et al., 2004, 2010; Gillan et al.,
2014; Mellers et al., 1999). We quantiﬁed counterfactual po-
tency as the slope of function for affect ratings based upon
the difference between obtained and non-obtained outcomes,
such that steeper slopes indicate greater modulation by the
difference between the outcomes. We analyzed the correla-
tion between this index and the luck ratings following near
events on the wheel-of-fortune task, predicting that partici-
pants with higher counterfactual potency would be more sen-
sitive to near-misses.
Our task also enabled a more exploratory analysis
decomposing the analogous subtypes of objective wins and
losses. In the present study, the spinner could stop either cen-
trally in the win (or loss) segment—a clear outcome—or
near the boundary to the adjacent null segment, a narrow out-
come. These events are commonplace within both gambling
games (e.g. winning a horserace by a clear distance or a
neck-to-neck ﬁnish) and other aspects of daily life (e.g. mak-
ing it to the airport with 2 hours to spare, or 5minutes). In a
stock market simulation (Markman & Tetlock, 2000), partic-
ipants gave more negative ratings when their chosen stock
outperformed the un-chosen stock by a narrow margin
(henceforth a “narrow win”) compared to when the chosen
stock substantially outperformed the other stock (henceforth
a “clear win”). These effects were mirrored for losses, and
outcome closeness further impacted subsequent willingness
to invest. In an analysis of NBA basketball games, teams that
were losing by narrow margin at half-time increased their ef-
fort and were ultimately more likely to win the match, com-
pared to teams that were winning by narrow margin at the
interval (Berger & Pope, 2011). Similar to the processing
of NW and NL, these responses to clear versus narrow
wins/losses likely also involve counterfactual thinking
(Markman & Tetlock, 2000). We hypothesized that narrow
wins compared to clear wins would prompt downward coun-
terfactuals and make our participants feel luckier, and con-
versely narrow losses compared to clear losses would elicit
upward counterfactuals and make people feel unluckier.
These analyses further considered the narrow event position,
distinguishing early events that have just entered the win/loss
segment (henceforth a “early win” or “early loss”) against
late events that have almost left the win/loss segment (hence-
forth a “late win” or “late loss”).
EXPERIMENT 1
Methods
Participants
We recruited 51 healthy volunteers (26 men, mean
age =24.69, SD=4.16, age range= 19 – 35) from the student
population at the University of Cambridge for a study of
gambling behavior. Our advert stated that participants should
be psychiatrically healthy, and it was directed toward stu-
dents with some interest in gambling (“Do you enjoy gam-
bling?”). We excluded psychology and economics students.
The Problem Gambling Severity Index (Ferris & Wynne,
2001) was administered to screen for potential gambling
problems. No participants were classiﬁed as problem gam-
bler (a score of 8 or more), and the majority of participants
(61%) scored 0. The study was conducted in accordance with
Declaration of Helsinki and was approved by the University
of Cambridge Psychology Research Ethics Committee. Writ-
ten informed consent was obtained from all participants. Vol-
unteers attended an individual testing session, which
comprised the wheel-of-fortune task and the counterfactual
thinking task. They were paid a ﬁxed fee as reimbursement
for their time, plus a ﬁnancial bonus that was proportional
to their actual earnings in the gambling tasks. Additional psy-
chophysiological data collected in this sample have been re-
ported elsewhere with different purposes (Wu & Clark, 2015;
Wu, van Dijk, Aitken, and Clark, 2016).
Wheel-of-fortune task
Participants completed 76 experimental trials on a computer-
ized wheel-of-fortune task modiﬁed from Wu, van Dijk, and
Clark (2015), using a spinner rather than highlighted
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segments to indicate gambling outcome. The task was pro-
grammed in Matlab, using the Psychophysics Toolbox exten-
sions (Brainard, 1997). On each trial, the wheel was divided
into four segments of different colors. The “+” or “” sym-
bols in each segment indicated the amounts stood to win or
lose. Those segments without any symbols represented zero
outcomes (neither win nor lose). The number (e.g. 10) indi-
cated the size of win/loss, as a multiplier of the amount par-
ticipants bet on that round. For instance, +10× meant that the
participant would win 10 times the bet, and 10× would lose
10 times of the bet.
The trial sequence and timings are displayed in Figure 2.
At the beginning of each trial, the participant was asked to
choose a bet between £0.10 and £0.90, in £0.10 increments.
Following bet selection, the spinner on the wheel spun for an
anticipation interval (5.3 – 6.9 seconds), during which time
the spinner decelerated to a standstill. The outcome phase
then lasted 1 second, where the spinner stopped, and there
was accompanying auditory feedback (applause sound for
winning outcomes, booing sound for losing outcome and
thud sound for null outcome), and the numeric outcome
was displayed for 1 second. Following the outcome phase,
a luck rating was displayed using a 9-point visual analogue
scale (“How lucky did you feel?”), with 1 indicating
“extremely unlucky” and 9 indicating “extremely lucky”.
No time constraints were imposed on the bet selection or
luck rating.
The outcomes were fair, with each event type repeated
ﬁve times. The closeness was manipulated in such a way that
on the near event trials, the distance of the spinner to the
segment boundary was 1.8°. For the clear outcomes (i.e.
clear-wins, clear-losses and two types of full-misses (FM)),
the spinner stopped 45° from the boundary of the segment.
We interspersed 16 ﬁller trials where the spinner landed at
various other positions on the wheel in order to make the task
more realistic. On average, participants won £9.59
(SD=16.43) in this task.
Counterfactual thinking task
Following the wheel-of-fortune task, participants completed
a counterfactual thinking task adapted from Camille et al.
(2004) (see Wu & Clark, 2015 for analysis of facial muscle
responses on this task). On each of 112 trials, participants
chose between two wheels that displayed different potential
gains and losses, and their respective probabilities. Each
wheel offered two of the following possible outcomes: +70,
+210, 70, 210, representing monetary values in pence
(i.e. British £). Outcome probability was illustrated by the
segment size occupied by that outcome (0.25, 0.5 or 0.75, see
Figure 3). As the participant selected a wheel, the wheel was
highlighted with a red surround. The obtained outcome on
that wheel was presented for 4 seconds, during which time
the non-selected wheel was hidden. After a further 4 seconds
of blank screen, the outcome on the non-selected wheel (i.e.
the non-obtained outcome) was revealed for 4 seconds. Par-
ticipants were then asked to rate “how pleased were you with
the outcome”, with 1 indicating extremely unpleasant and 9
indicating extremely pleasant. This was followed by a 4 sec-
ond inter-trial interval (to optimize the task for psychophysi-
ology, not reported here). No time constraints were imposed
on wheel selection or affect ratings. Outcomes were pre-
speciﬁed in line with the displayed probabilities in order that
the task was fair. On average, participants won £12.65
(SD=5.51) on the task.
Statistical analysis
Wheel-of-fortune task: We used R and nlme (Pinheiro, Bates,
DebRoy, & Sarkar, 2013) to perform two linear mixed ef-
fects analyses on the dependent variables: (i) luck ratings
(centered; 0 means neither lucky nor unlucky); (ii) the
change in the bet amount (from the current n trial to the next,
n+1, trial). We use linear mixed-effects (LME) modeling via
restricted maximum likelihood for all repeated-measures
analyses (Judd, Westfall, & Kenny, 2012). As a random ef-
fect, we had an intercept representing participant number.
For the two dependent variables, we ran a series of LME
models to test each set of hypotheses. In a preliminary model
run as a manipulation check, we assessed the impact of the
objective outcomes (e.g. wins, losses and null) as a ﬁxed ef-
fect. In the second step, we compared three types of null out-
comes, i.e. NW, NL and FM. In the third step, we considered
whether near-miss position (before vs. after) was relevant,
treating both near-miss type and position as ﬁxed effects
(with interaction terms). In the ﬁnal step, we compared the
three types of win outcomes (model 4a, i.e. early-wins,
clear-wins and late-wins), and the three types of loss
outcomes (model 4b, i.e. early-losses, clear-losses and
Figure 2. Trial timing for the wheel-of-fortune task. [Colour ﬁgure
can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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late-losses). Visual inspection of residual plots did not reveal
any obvious deviation from homoscedasticity or normality.
For the models on luck ratings, the bet amount at the start
of current trial (i.e. before the outcome was delivered) was
entered as a ﬁxed factor of no interest. To assess the validity
of the mixed effect analysis, we performed likelihood ratio
tests comparing the models with ﬁxed effects to the null
models with only the random effects. We rejected results in
which the model including ﬁxed effects did not differ signif-
icantly from the null model.
Counterfactual thinking task: For the affect ratings
following the non-obtained outcomes, the size of the ob-
tained and non-obtained outcomes were entered as predic-
tors, along with the interaction term. The counterfactual
index was calculated by regressing the difference between
what was obtained and what could have been obtained
had the participant chosen the other wheel (obtained out-
come minus non-obtained outcome on the non-selected
wheel) against the subjective ratings. A steeper slope
(i.e. more positive value) indicated greater relief for down-
ward counterfactuals and stronger regret for upward
counterfactuals.
Results and discussion
Wheel-of-fortune task
Objective outcomes. Luck ratings. The ﬁrst model investi-
gated the effect of the different objective outcomes (three
levels: wins vs. losses vs. neutral) on luck ratings (see
Figure 4A). There was a signiﬁcant main effect of
Outcome Type, χ2(2) = 117.65, p< .001, with participants
feeling luckier following wins compared to neutral out-
comes, b=1.05, t(100) = 6.64, p< .001, and following
neutral outcomes compared to losses, b=1.27, t(100)
= 8.01, p< .001.
Betting behavior. The objective outcomes also impacted
differently upon betting behavior (see Figure 4B), χ2(2)
= 36.11, p< .001, with participants reducing their bet fol-
lowing wins compared to both neutral outcomes,
b=7.09, t(100) =4.66, p< .001, and losses,
b=9.17, t(100) =6.02, p< .001. There was no statisti-
cal difference between losses and neutral outcomes on bet
amount change, b=2.08, t(100) = 1.37, p= .18.
Thus, as a manipulation check, our participants felt
luckier following wins and unluckier following losses,
conﬁrming that the task effectively induced distinct luck
perceptions for the basic objective outcomes. The ﬁnding
that the amount bet reduced following wins is consistent
with a broad deﬁnition of the “gambler’s fallacy” that
people do not expect runs to continue in a random
sequence (Ayton & Fischer, 2004).
Decomposing neutral outcomes. Luck ratings. In the next set
of tests, we compared the three types of neutral outcomes
(see Figure 5A), i.e. NW versus NL versus FM. There was
a signiﬁcant main effect of Outcome Type, χ2(2) = 81.89,
p< .001. NL signiﬁcantly increased luck ratings com-
pared to FM, b=0.68, t(100) = 5.70, p< .001, while NW
signiﬁcantly reduced luck ratings relative to FM,
b=0.66, t(100) =5.50, p< .001.
Figure 3. Trial timing for the counterfactual thinking task. [Colour ﬁgure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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Betting behavior. There was no difference in betting be-
havior following the different types of neutral outcomes
(see Figure 5B), χ2(2) = .21, p> .1.
Near outcomes by position. Luck ratings. The third model
distinguished four types of near-misses based on both
near-miss type (NW vs. NL) and near-miss position
(before vs. after) (see Figure 5C). The interaction term
was signiﬁcant, χ2(1) = 9.90, p= .001. For NW, the NW-
after were rated as unluckier than NW-before, b=0.19,
t(50) = 2.27, p< .05. For NL, NL-after were rated as luck-
ier than NL-before, b=0.41, t(50) =3.24, p< .01.
Betting behavior. While we observed no overall effect of
near-misses on betting in the previous model, a signiﬁcant
interaction was observed between near-miss type (NW vs.
NL) and near-miss position (before vs. after) on betting
behavior (see Figure 5D), χ2(1) = 18.84, p< .001.
Following NW, participants reduced their bet for NW-
after compared to NW-before, b=9.18, t(50) = 3.46,
p= .001. Following NL, participants increased their bet
following NL-after compared to NL-before, b=6.16,
t(50) = 2.72, p< .01.
Thus, NW decreased self-perceived luck, whereas NL in-
creased self-perceived luck. This effect was moderated by
near-miss position, such that NW-after were perceived as
unluckier than NW-before, consistent with the previous
observation that an aversive response was stronger with
NW-after (Clark et al., 2013). On betting behavior, NW-
before increased subsequent bet amount compared to
NW-after, replicating the motivational effect of NW in
the slot machine task (Clark et al., 2009, 2013; Qi, Ding,
Song, & Yang, 2011). Conversely, NL-after was rated as
signiﬁcantly luckier than NL-before, and NL-after in-
creased bet amount more than NL-before.
Figure 4. (A) Luck ratings following the three types of objective outcomes and (B) bet amount change following the three types of objective
outcomes. Error bars represent standard errors of the mean
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Subtypes of objective wins. Luck ratings. In the next step, we
distinguished the three types of win outcomes, i.e. early-
wins versus clear-wins versus late-wins (see Figure 6A).
There was a signiﬁcant main effect of Outcome Type,
χ2(2) = 7.52, p< .05, with late-wins increasing luck feel-
ings compared to clear-wins, b=0.30, t(100) = 2.77,
p< .01. No difference between early-wins and clear-wins
was found, b=0.13, t(100) = 1.15, p> .1.
Betting behavior. The three subtypes of win outcomes
also exerted a differential effect on the subsequent bet
amount (see Figure 6B), χ2(2) = 8.88, p= .01, with the
overall reduction in betting seen most strongly for early-
wins and clear-wins, relative to late-wins, b=6.04, t
(100) =2.11, p< .05, and b=8.35, t(100) = 2.92,
p< .01, respectively.
Subtypes of objective losses. Luck ratings. In distinguishing
the three subtypes of losses, i.e. early-losses versus
clear-losses versus late-losses (see Figure 6C), the main
effect of Outcome Type was at a trend level of signiﬁ-
cance, χ2(2) = 5.52, p= .06, and should thus be interpreted
with caution. In the pairwise comparisons, clear-losses
were rated signiﬁcantly unluckier than late-losses,
b=0.22, t(100) = 2.32, p= .02.
Betting behavior. For the differential effect of loss type on
bet amount change, there was a signiﬁcant main effect of
Outcome Type (see Figure 6D), χ2(2) = 9.50, p< .01, with
late-losses increasing bet amount compared to both early-
losses and clear-losses, b=4.56, t(100) = 2.30, p< .05,
and b=5.92, t(100) = 2.98, p< .01, respectively.
Thus, betting behavior differed between clear-cut and
close-call outcomes for objective gains and losses, with
marginal evidence for an analogous effect on luck ratings.
For objective wins, late-wins (one type of narrow-wins)
were perceived as luckiest, and this appeared to attenuate
the reduction in bet amount following wins. For objective
losses, late-losses (one type of narrow-loss) were rated as
luckiest, and elicited the largest increase in subsequent
betting following losses.
Counterfactual thinking task. Affect ratings following the
presentation of non-obtained outcomes were ﬁrst analyzed
Figure 5. (A) Luck ratings following the three types of null outcomes, (B) bet amount change following the three types of null outcomes,
(C) luck ratings as a function of Near-Miss Type (Near-Win, Near Loss) and Near-Miss Position (Before, After) and (D) bet amount
change as a function of Near-Miss Type (Near-Win, Near Loss) and Near-Miss Position (Before, After). Error bars represent standard
errors of the mean
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using the magnitude of the obtained and non-obtained
outcomes as two predictors, as well as their interaction term.
Importantly, the affect ratings were modulated by the
non-obtained outcome, such that the participants felt worse
when the non-obtained outcome was more positive (i.e.
regret) and reported higher affect when the non-obtained out-
come was more negative (i.e. relief), b=0.0057,
t=40.38, p< .001. This conﬁrms that the task effectively
induced counterfactual comparisons. There was also an
expected main effect of obtained outcome, as well as a
signiﬁcant interaction effect.1
The slope of the affect ratings as a function of the dif-
ference between the obtained and non-obtained outcomes
was used to index counterfactual potency: a more positive
value indicates greater sensitivity to regret and relief. The
change of luck ratings from NW to NL (i.e. NL – NW)
in the wheel-of-fortune task provided an index of sensitiv-
ity to near-misses (more positive values indicate greater
responsivity to near-misses). Across individuals, the slope
of the regression line in the counterfactual thinking task
was positively correlated with the change score in the
wheel-of-fortune task (see Figure 7), r=0.47, p< .001.
We also assessed the relationships between counterfactual
potency and sensitivity to the subtypes of near-misses
(see Table 1). Counterfactual potency was negatively
correlated with NW-before (i.e. NW-before—FM, more
negative values indicate greater responsivity, because
NW-before decreased luck ratings compared to FM),
r=0.36, p< .01, and NW-after (i.e. NW-after—FM),
r=0.47, p< .001. Counterfactual potency was positively
correlated with NL-before (i.e. NL-before—FM: more
positive values indicate greater responsivity, because NL-
before increased luck ratings compared to FM), r=0.34,
p= .015.
1We decomposed the interaction effect by looking at the effect of non-
obtained outcomes at each level of objective outcome. When participants ob-
jectively won the maximum amount (i.e. +210), they felt subjectively
better if the non-obtained outcomes were more negative (i.e. relief),
b =0.002, t =4.39, p< .001. When they objectively won a moderate
amount (i.e. +70), they felt worse if the non-obtained outcome was more
positive (+210, i.e. regret) and felt better if the non-obtained outcomes were
more negative (70 or 210, i.e. relief), b =0.005, t =32.55, p< .001.
This slope was steepest when participants objectively lost a moderate
amount (i.e. 70), b =0.007, t =36.27, p< .001. When participants lost
the maximum amount (i.e. 210), they felt worse if the non-obtained out-
comes were more positive (i.e. regret), b =0.005, t =3.88, p< .001, but
this effect was somewhat blunted by a ﬂoor effect (see Wu & Clark, 2015).
Figure 6. (A) Luck ratings following the three types of objective wins, (B) bet amount change following the three types of objective wins, (C)
luck ratings following the three types of objective losses and (D) bet amount change following the three types of objective losses. Error bars
represent standard errors of the mean
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EXPERIMENT 2
The correlation between near-miss and regret/relief tasks
provides evidence for a counterfactual mechanism for
near-misses. The position effect observed on the near-miss
task is also consistent with a counterfactual account, based
on additive versus subtractive thoughts. This counterfactual
explanation for the position effect assumes a mental simu-
lation that may be elicited by the motion trajectory of the
spinner during the anticipation phase. However, other as-
pects of outcome processing may not require the visual in-
put of the motion trajectory and depend only upon the ﬁnal
outcome. For example, participants’ prior experience with
spinning wheels may be sufﬁcient to simulate the basic dif-
ference between NW, NL, and the objective gains and
losses; the movement leading up to those outcomes may
be psychologically irrelevant. For Experiment 2, we rea-
soned that a manipulation of the anticipatory phase would
provide a further test of the counterfactual hypothesis.
We compared two groups of participants: the ﬁrst group
played an identical wheel-of-fortune task as in Experiment
1. The second group performed the task with one modiﬁca-
tion: we removed the visual presentation of the wheel spin
and deceleration, thus removing any visual inﬂuence of the
motion trajectory in generating the near-miss position ef-
fect. We hypothesized that if the near-miss position effect
depends on the motion trajectory, then the distinction be-
tween near-misses in the “before” and “after” positions
should disappear in the modiﬁed (“no-spin”) version. We
also aimed to corroborate the main ﬁndings of Experiment
1 in a separate group of participants.
Methods
One hundred and four healthy Chinese students (51 men,
mean age =21.56, SD=1.44, age range= 19 – 26) were ran-
domized to two conditions of the wheel-of-fortune task. No
participants were classiﬁed as problem gamblers based on a
translated Chinese version of Problem Gambling Severity In-
dex. For the spinning version (n=52), the task was identical
to Experiment 1. For the no-spin version (n=52), following
bet selection, the participants viewed a 4 second blank screen
followed by a reveal of the ﬁnal position of the spinner on the
wheel, indicating the outcome for that trial. For data analysis,
Condition (spinning vs. no-spinning) was added as a
between-subjects factor.
Results and discussion
Objective outcomes
Luck ratings. In the ﬁrst model investigating the objective
outcomes (wins vs. losses vs. neutral) in the two Conditions
(spin vs. no spin), the main effect of Outcome Type was sig-
niﬁcant (see Figure 4A), χ2(2) = 287.54, p< .001, with par-
ticipants feeling luckier following wins compared to neutral
outcomes, b=1.34, t(202) = 12.30, p< .001, and following
neutral outcomes compared to losses, b=1.34, t(202)
= 12.14, p< .001. There was no signiﬁcant main effect of
Condition, χ2(1) = 0.28, p> .1, or Outcome Type×Condition
interaction, χ2(2) = 2.06, p> .1.
Betting behavior. There was a signiﬁcant main effect of
Outcome Type (see Figure 4B), χ2(2) = 34.80, p< .001. Wins
reduced betting compared to both losses and neutral
Figure 7. Correlation between individual’s sensitivity to near-misses and counterfactual thinking. [Colour ﬁgure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
Table 1. Correlation between counterfactual potency and each
subtype of outcome
r p
Near-win before 0.36 .0086
Near-win after 0.47 .0006
Near-loss before 0.34 .0151
Near-loss after 0.24 .0908
Early win 0.24 .0865
Late win 0.11 .4418
Early loss 0.02 .8778
Late loss 0.09 .5499
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outcomes, b=5.25, t(202) =5.88, p< .001, and
b=3.70, t(202) =4.14, p< .001, respectively. The differ-
ence between losses and neutral outcomes was only margin-
ally signiﬁcant, b=1.56, t(202) =1.74, p= .08. Neither the
main effect of Condition nor the interaction term was signif-
icant, both ps> .1.
Thus, our participants felt luckier after wins and unluckier
after losses, in both the spinning and no-spin conditions, with
no discernible differences in the objective outcomes between
the two versions of the task. Participants reduced their bets
following wins, in line with a “gambler’s fallacy” account
and consistent with Experiment 1.
Decomposing neutral outcomes
Luck ratings. In the model distinguishing the three types of
neutral outcomes (NW vs. NL vs. FM), there was a signiﬁ-
cant main effect of Condition (see Figure 5A), χ2(1) = 5.18,
p< .05, with higher overall luck ratings on the spinning task
than the no-spin task. A possible explanation is that the spin-
ning and decelerating phase in the spin condition made it eas-
ier for the participants to generate counterfactuals, thus
giving rise to heightened luck-ratings. The main effect of
Outcome Type was signiﬁcant, χ2(2) = 86.94, p< .001, and
qualiﬁed by a signiﬁcant Outcome Type×Condition interac-
tion, χ2(2) = 51.84, p< .001. Simple effects analysis looked
at the outcome types in the two conditions separately. In
the spinning condition, there was a signiﬁcant main effect
of Outcome Type, χ2(2) = 89.58, p< .001: NL increased
self-perceived luck relative to FM, b=0.87, t(102) =6.01,
p< .001, while NW decreased luck ratings, b=0.85, t
(102) =5.89, p< .001. In the no-spin condition, the main
effect of Outcome Type was also signiﬁcant, albeit with a
smaller effect size (R2 = .02 in the no-spin task vs. R2 = .18
in the spinning task), χ2(2) = 13.02, p= .0015: NL increased
luck ratings compared to FM, b=0.23, t(102) = 2.36,
p< .05, but there was no signiﬁcant difference between
NW and FM, p= .19.
Betting behavior. There was a signiﬁcant main effect of
Outcome Type (see Figure 5B), χ2(2) = 8.47, p= .01. NW in-
creased bet amount compared to both NL and FM, b=2.16, t
(202) = 2.27, p< .05, and b=2.62, t(202) = 2.74, p< .01, re-
spectively, but there was no difference between FM and
NL, p> .1. There was no signiﬁcant main effect of Condition
or interaction term, ps> .1.
Near outcomes by position
Luck ratings. There was a signiﬁcant three-way interaction
between Condition (spin vs. no-spinning), Near-Miss Type
(NW vs. NL) and Near-Miss Position (before vs. after) (see
Figure 5C), χ2(1) = 4.97, p< .05. For simple effects analysis,
we tested the two-way interaction between near-miss type
and near-miss position in the two conditions separately. In
the (original) spin condition, there was a signiﬁcant Near-
Miss Type by Near-Miss Position interaction, χ2(1) = 20.55,
p< .001. For NW, NW-after were rated as unluckier than
NW-before, b=0.24, t(51) =2.46, p= .017. For NL,
NL-after were rated as luckier than NL-before, b=0.44, t
(51) = 3.55, p< .001. In the no-spin condition, the interaction
between Near-Miss Type and Near-Miss Position was only
marginally signiﬁcant, p= .07. There was a signiﬁcant main
effect of Near-Miss Type, χ2(1) = 9.68, p= .0019, such that
NL increased luck ratings compared to NW, b=0.36, t(51)
= 3.26, p= .002. The main effect of Near-Miss Position was
not signiﬁcant, p> .1.
Betting behavior. There was a signiﬁcant three-way Condi-
tion by Near-Miss Type by Near-Miss Position interaction
on the bet amount change (see Figure 5D), χ2(1) = 5.90,
p= .015. Considering the two-way interactions of near-miss
type and near-miss position in the two conditions separately,
there was a reliable interaction in the spinning condition,
χ2(1) = 20.26, p< .001. NW-before increased bet amount
change compared to NW-after, b=7.85, t(51) = 3.77,
p< .001, while NL-after increase bets relative to NL-before,
b=5.23, t(51) = 2.81, p< .01. In the no-spin condition, the
near-miss Type by Position interaction was marginally sig-
niﬁcant, p= .07, and the main effect for Near-Miss Position
was not signiﬁcant, p= .99. The main effect of Near-Miss
Type was signiﬁcant, b=0.36, t(51) = 3.26, p< .05, corrobo-
rating the ﬁnding in the last model that NL increased luck
feelings compared to NW.
Thus, the effects of near-miss position from Experiment 1
were reproduced in the original condition with the spin and
deceleration, but were attenuated (to the point of non-
signiﬁcance) in the no-spin condition.
Subtypes of objective wins
Luck ratings. In the model comparing the three types of ob-
jective wins (early-wins vs. clear-wins vs. late-wins), there
was a signiﬁcant main effect of Outcome Type (see
Figure 6A), χ2(2) = 36.34, p< .001, with late-wins increasing
luck feelings compared to both clear-wins and early-wins,
b=0.48, t(202) = 5.91, p< .001, and b=0.39, t(202) = 4.86,
p< .001, respectively. There was no signiﬁcant main effect
of Condition, χ2(1) = 0.22, p> .1, or Condition×Outcome
Type interaction, χ2(2) = 3.17, p> .1.
Betting behavior. The main effect of Outcome Type was sig-
niﬁcant (see Figure 6B), χ2(2) = 9.00, p= .01. Both late-wins
and clear-wins decreased bet amount compared to early-
wins, b=3.27, t(202) =1.84, p< .06, and b=5.31, t
(202) =2.99, p< .01, respectively. Neither the main effect
of Condition nor the interaction term was signiﬁcant,
p> .1, and p= .08, respectively.
Subtypes of objective losses
Luck ratings. In the model comparing the three subtypes of
losses (early-losses vs. clear-losses vs. late-losses), there
was a signiﬁcant main effect of Outcome Type (see
Figure 6C), χ2(2) = 15.69, p< .001, and a signiﬁcant
Condition ×Outcome Type interaction, χ2(2) = 11.35,
p< .01. The main effect of Condition was not signiﬁcant,
χ2(1) = 0.005, p> .1. For simple effects analysis, we looked
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at differences between loss outcomes in the two conditions
separately. In the spinning task, there was a signiﬁcant main
effect of Outcome Type, χ2(2) = 11.08, p< .01: early-losses
were rated as unluckier than both clear-losses and late-
losses, b=0.44, t(102) =3.35, p< .001, and b=0.29, t
(102) =2.23, p< .05, respectively. In the no-spin condi-
tion, there was also a signiﬁcant main effect of Outcome
Type, χ2(2) = 15.27, p< .001, where both early-losses and
clear-losses were rated as unluckier than late-losses,
b=0.42, t(102) =3.30, p= .001, and b=0.45, t(102)
=3.49, p< .001, respectively.
Betting behavior. There was no signiﬁcant main effect of
Outcome Type or Condition (see Figure 6D), both ps> .1.
The Outcome Type×Condition interaction was not signiﬁ-
cant, p> .1.
Thus, signiﬁcant differences emerged between clear-cut
and close-call outcomes for both objective gains and losses,
and these effects were further moderated by the visual dis-
play of the motion trajectory during the anticipatory phase.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Using a wheel-of-fortune task, the present study investi-
gated the subjective and behavioral responses to various
near events within the framework of counterfactual think-
ing. Past work on near-misses has predominantly focused
on NW, which are common events in the context of gam-
bling behavior. The present study extended this work by
also presenting NL, a logical counterpart of NW, and by
further testing for a modulatory role of near-miss position
(i.e. whether the spinner stopped just before or after the
missed outcome). In Experiment 1, NL were perceived as
much luckier, replicating a previous observation by Wu,
van Dijk, and Clark (2015; see also Wohl & Enzle, 2003).
Near-miss position had a differential impact on NW: NW-
after were perceived as unluckier than NW-before, consis-
tent with our past work using a laboratory slot machine task
(Clark et al., 2013). Conversely, NL-after were rated as
luckier compared to NL-before. In Experiment 2, this inter-
action between near-miss type and near-miss position was
corroborated in an independent (and culturally distinct)
sample, but the effect of near-miss position was attenuated
in a modiﬁed task where the motion trajectory of the spin-
ner during the anticipatory interval was removed. Experi-
ment 1 also included a second decision-making task
measuring affective responses to counterfactual compari-
sons. Individual differences in “counterfactual potency”—
effectively, the degree of affect corresponding to regret
and relief—were seen to predict the sensitivity to NW and
NL on the wheel-of-fortune task.
On the counterfactual nature of gambling near-misses
In Experiment 1, the counterfactual potency index on a stan-
dard choice between two lotteries task (Mellers et al., 1999)
correlated with the sensitivity to both NW and NL on our
gambling task. Elsewhere, the strength or magnitude with
which a particular counterfactual is experienced (i.e.
counterfactual intensity) has been found to correlate with
subsequent affective and behavioral reactions (Sanna &
Turley-Ames, 2000). A recent study characterized counter-
factual potency as the multiplicative combination of “if like-
lihood” (the degree to which the antecedent condition of the
counterfactual is perceived to be likely) and “then likeli-
hood” (the perceived conditional likelihood of the outcome
of the counterfactual). This measure predicted the extent to
which counterfactual thinking inﬂuenced judgments of re-
gret, causation and responsibility (Petrocelli et al., 2011).
In our gambling task, the NW elicit upward counterfactuals
(e.g. “I almost landed on the big one”) whereas NL out-
comes induce downward counterfactual (e.g. “I could have
gone bankrupt”) (Wohl & Enzle, 2003; Wu et al., 2015).
The observed relationship between counterfactual potency
and sensitivity to NW and NL provides correlative support
for a counterfactual mechanism of processing near-miss out-
comes. Note that in both Sanna and Turley-Ames (2000) and
Petrocelli et al. (2011) who used scenario settings, the index
to represent counterfactual strength was derived from the
scenario itself to predict its effect upon emotional response.
In the present study, the counterfactual potency was derived
from an independent task.
The counterfactual account is further strengthened in our
data by the interaction effect between near-miss type (NW
vs. NL) and near-miss position (before vs. after), seen for
both luck ratings and bet amount change. For both types of
NW, participants compared a neutral outcome with the coun-
terfactual possibility of a (non-obtained) win. NW-before im-
plies a trajectory toward the win segment in which the
spinner stops just before the win. In this case, the perception
of having almost won requires that the participants mentally
simulate the spinner moving forward; an additive upward
counterfactual (Roese, 1994). For the NW-after, when partic-
ipants ﬁrst experienced the win state and then see the spinner
move on to stop in the null segment, the counterfactual re-
quires the mental undoing of the ﬁnal move, a subtractive up-
ward counterfactual. Our ﬁndings suggest that subtractive
process makes participants feel unluckier, compared to the
additive process. The ﬁnding of increased bet following
NW-before compared to NW-after extended our observation
that NW-before enhanced self-reported motivation (Clark
et al., 2013) by showing a behavioral effect on actual bet
adjustment.
The position effect for NL mirrored its effect on NW, such
that NL-after were perceived as luckier compared to NL-
before. Both types of NL made participants compare the neu-
tral outcome with the undesirable loss alternative (i.e. a
downward counterfactual). But participants experienced the
escape from a major penalty most vividly on the NL-after
outcomes, when the spinner exited the loss zone and entered
the safe zone. To experience a downward counterfactual, the
participant would need to mentally undo this escape (i.e. a
subtractive counterfactual). For NL-before, the spinner
stopped just short of the loss segment, and the participant
would need to mentally simulate the extra motion to achieve
the downward counterfactual (i.e. an additive counterfac-
tual). As a result, the NL-after was reliably experienced as
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luckier compared to NL-before. The differential effect of ad-
ditive versus subtractive counterfactual also affected subse-
quent bet behavior such that NL-after enhanced bet
compared to NL-before. The interactive effect of near-miss
type by near-miss position extends Wohl and Enzle (2003,
Experiment 2) in which they manipulated near-miss position
but did not ﬁnd any modulatory effect on either subjective
ratings or betting behavior. Taken together, the interactive
effect of near-miss type and near-miss position is consistent
with the established inﬂuence of types (upward vs. down-
ward) and structure (additive vs. subtractive) of counterfac-
tual thinking (Roese, 1994).
In Experiment 2, the near-miss position effect—the disso-
ciable effects of near-misses occurring in the before versus
after positions—was attenuated in the version of the task
where the wheel spin and deceleration were no longer visi-
ble. This indicates that the visual stimulus of the anticipatory
build-up is necessary to generate the additive versus subtrac-
tive thoughts. In contrast, the near-miss type effect (i.e. NW
vs. NL) observed in Experiment 1 was replicated in both
conditions in Experiment 2, although was somewhat attenu-
ated in the no-spin task. Previous research has shown that in-
dividuals who are prone to vivid mental imagery tend to have
stronger emotional reactivity to counterfactuals (Barlett &
Brannon, 2007). These data suggest that the distinction be-
tween NW and NL seems to be outcome-related effects that
are not dependent upon the visual input of the motion
trajectory.
Our position effect can also be considered within the
framework of the reﬂection and evaluation model (REM)
of comparative thinking (see Markman & McMullen, 2003
for a review). The REM proposes that two psychologically
distinct models of mental simulation operate during compar-
ative thinking. In reﬂection, an experiential (“as if”) mode of
thinking is characterized by vividly simulating that informa-
tion about the comparison standard is true of, or part of, the
self. In evaluation, information about the standard is used as
a reference point against which to evaluate one’s present
standing. Thus, in the case of the NW before outcome, the
spinner initially decelerates within the neutral segment, but
as the spinner begins to approach the win segment, the par-
ticipant may mentally simulate the possibility of a win. Ac-
cording to the REM, when attention is focused only on the
counterfactual outcome (McMullen, 1997), reﬂective pro-
cessing triggers an assimilation effect (e.g. “Wow, that was
exciting – I nearly won”). In the case of NW after, the par-
ticipants momentarily expect to win as the spinner is
slowing down in a win position. This focuses their attention
on winning. At the very end, however, the win is withheld,
and this unexpected result focuses their attention on both the
NW and the obtained neutral outcome, triggering an evalua-
tive contrast effect (e.g. “my loss feels really bad because I
almost won”). Thus, the contrast effect for NW after reduced
luck ratings compared to the assimilation effect for NW
before. In a similar way, the NL before outcome engages re-
ﬂective processing (i.e. assimilation effect) and thus induces
negative affect, whereas the NL after outcome triggers eval-
uative processing (i.e. contrast effect) to induce positive
affect.
Other accounts of near-misses
At this point, it may be appropriate to compare our insights to
alternative accounts of near miss effects. One account draw-
ing upon behavioral learning theory is based on frustrative
non-reward. This posits that as goal pursuit is thwarted
(e.g. on a NW), it elicits increased reward-seeking effort
(Amsel, 1958). In the case of NW, the salience of the non-
win outcome being proximal to the goal (e.g. the jackpot) in-
duces a negative emotional state (Clark et al., 2012; Dixon,
Harrigan, Jarick, Fugelsang, & Sheepy, 2011), which serves
to increase the motivation to gamble further, putatively in or-
der to alleviate the aversive state. Frustration theory is com-
patible with the motivational effects of NW, but is difﬁcult
to reconcile with the dissociations between motivational rat-
ings and physiological arousal following NW-after and NW-
before effects (Clark et al. 2013). Frustration theory also
makes no strong predictions concerning NL events. A second
contemporary explanation, grounded in the cognitive ap-
proach to gambling, is that NW are falsely interpreted as skill
acquisition, and thereby foster the “illusion of control”
(Billieux, Van der Linden, Khazaal, Zullino, & Clark,
2012; Clark et al., 2013, 2009). In games involving skill,
NW outcomes may provide indication of skill acquisition
and constitute useful signal of imminent success. Similar to
the frustration theory, this learning account is compatible
with the motivational effect of NW, but does not readily ex-
plain the differential effect of near-miss position.
By proposing a counterfactual account for near-misses,
we do not seek to argue against these alternative accounts.
Near-misses are psychologically complex events involving
conﬂicting emotional responses and cognitive appraisals,
both of which inﬂuence subsequent gambling decisions
(Clark et al., 2013). Both the frustration and skill acquisition
account are compatible with some aspects of the near-miss
ﬁndings in the winning context (i.e. NW), but they do not
readily explain the position effect, and they do not generate
clear predictions for the reaction to a NL, a type of outcome
that has received much less empirical attention to date. Re-
cent research using anecdotes of natural disasters suggests
that NL inﬂuence decision-making by reducing the future
perceived risk of that event happening (Dillon & Tinsley,
2008). The counterfactual account complements these alter-
native accounts by accommodating both NW and NL ﬁnd-
ings within one framework.
Narrow versus clear objective outcomes
In the present study, we also obtained preliminary evidence
showing that people process objective wins and losses differ-
ently depending on whether they constitute clear outcomes
(i.e. winning or losing by a clear margin) or narrow outcomes
(i.e. winning or losing by a narrow margin). Across the two
experiments, one type of narrow-win (the late win) was con-
sistently perceived as luckier, compared to clear-wins. For
the narrow-wins, people compare the winning outcome with
the anticipated, less desirable null outcome (i.e. a downward
counterfactual), and this may enhance positive feelings.
Some other effects were not consistent across both experi-
ments, and we reserve interpretation of those events until
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further replications have been attempted. Future research is
needed to elucidate the mechanism by which narrow out-
comes impact on decision-making and the effect of the
narrow-miss positions.
Relationships between luck ratings and betting behavior
adjustment
The present study also demonstrated multiple inﬂuences on
betting behavior. One line of research has shown that in-
duced feelings of luck increase subsequent risky choice
(Darke & Freedman, 1997; Jiang, Cho, & Adaval, 2009;
Wohl & Enzle, 2003). Experiencing a lucky event increased
self-reported conﬁdence and betting on a subsequent gamble,
and this effect was moderated by personal beliefs in luck
conceptualized as a personality trait (Darke & Freedman,
1997). Priming participants with luck-related concepts also
increased their self-perceived luck and risky ﬁnancial choices
(Jiang et al., 2009). Of more direct relevance to the present
study, Wohl and Enzle (2003) found that NL increased luck
feelings and increased the amount bet on a subsequent gam-
ble on a separate event. Thus, under some circumstances,
temporarily induced lucky states appear to enhance risk tak-
ing. Our data speak against this reasoning. As a manipulation
check in the present study, objective wins increased self-
perceived luck compared to null outcomes, whereas objec-
tive losses decreased self-perceived luck. However, the bet
amount change responded in the opposite direction: objective
wins were rated as the luckiest events, but reduced subse-
quent betting to the greatest extent, and vice versa for objec-
tive losses. In our view, these effects are best conceptualized
in relation to a gambler’s fallacy-type mechanism; people do
not expect successive wins (losses) in a random task, and
therefore strategically reduce (increase) their bet to maximize
their earnings on the task.
Note that in the present study, after the participant made a
bet, the wheel spin was controlled by the computer rather
than by the player himself. Perceived control can have im-
portant effects in gambling decisions. For instance, individ-
uals have inﬂated self-conﬁdence when they can exert
irrelevant control over chance event (i.e. illusory control;
Langer, Marcus, Roth, & Hall, 1975). Future studies would
beneﬁt from testing the modulatory role of perceived control
in processing near-miss outcomes (see Clark et al., 2009).
Conclusions
Characterization of the psychological processes that underlie
near-miss experiences not only informs gambling research
but also has implications for economic decision-making in
general. The present study demonstrates that individuals
who were more susceptible to counterfactual comparisons
were also more sensitive to near-miss outcomes. NW and
NL had differential effect upon subjective luck-feelings and
betting behavior, and this was further moderated by near-
miss position, consistent with established inﬂuence of
upward versus downward and additive versus subtractive
thoughts in counterfactual thinking. Critically, the near-miss
position effect depends on the spinning and decelerating
effect in the anticipatory phase. Taken together, these date
help substantiate the counterfactual account of near-misses.
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